Changing trends in the labor force: a survey by Riccardo DiCecio et al.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008 47
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The composition of the American workforce has changed dramatically over the past half century
as a result of both the emergence of married women as a substantial component of the labor force
and an increase in the number of minority workers. The aging of the population has contributed
to this change as well. In this paper, the authors review the evidence of changing labor force par-
ticipation rates, estimate the trends in labor force participation over the past 50 years, and find that
aggregate participation has stabilized after a period of persistent increases. Moreover, they examine
the disparate labor force participation experiences of different demographic groups. Finally, they
survey some of the studies that have provided explanations for these differences. (JEL J21, E32)
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labor market relative to the total number of resi-
dents in the country. Such a trend has likely
contributed to the rise in U.S. living standards
(e.g., income per capita) over the postwar period.
In spite of this long-run rise in the LFPR,
there has been a modest drop in the overall par-
ticipation rate within the past six years, which
has generated some concern among economists.
If this decrease represents a change in the trend
LFPR, the U.S. economy may be faced with fewer
work-oriented individuals per resident in the
coming decades.
What accounts for the changes in the LFPR
in the United States over the past several decades?
Numerous studies have documented changes in
various U.S. demographics, including the age and
ethnic composition of the population, that have
significantly affected the nature of the labor force.
In 1960, prime-age white males—from 25 to 54
years of age—comprised, by far, the largest labor
force component: nearly 40 percent. Although
this group still represented 31 percent of the work-
O
ne of the primary indicators of the
state of the U.S. labor market is the
labor force participation rate (LFPR).
It is measured each month by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as the fraction
of the civilian, non-institutional population 16
years or older who are either working or actively
seeking work. The LFPR is a useful complement
to other indicators, such as employment and the
unemployment rate, in assessing labor market
conditions. For example, a low unemployment
rate is a much stronger indication of a tight labor
market when accompanied by a high participa-
tion rate.
Although the LFPR is constantly changing
over the business cycle, the most noticeable fea-
ture is its dramatic increase over the post-World
War II period. Between 1948 and 2006, the U.S.
LFPR rose by more than 7 percentage points, with
the majority of the rise taking place between the
early 1960s and 2000. This increase implies that,
compared with several decades ago, there are
more individuals currently participating in the
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groups appears to be closing. In particular,
increases in both minority and women workers
have dramatically altered the composition of
the workforce. Moreover, the aging of the baby
boomers has changed the age profile of the
American population.
In this paper, we review the trends in labor
force participation over the past half century,
including a look at both the long-run movements
in the LFPR as well as its short-run fluctuations.
We then examine the components of the LFPR—
disaggregating by gender, age, and race—to deter-
mine the extent of and possible explanations for
the dispersion in labor force participation across
demographic groups. Finally, we consider the
future of the LFPR in the United States.
TRENDS IN AGGREGATE LABOR
FORCE PARTICIPATION
The BLS maintains a monthly history of
labor force participation statistics dating back to
1948. These figures are derived from the Current
Population Survey, which reports information
on approximately 60,000 households.1 The top
panel of Figure 1 shows the historical path of
aggregate labor force participation in the United
States; the overall increase in the participation
rate since 1948 is evident. In January 1948, the
overall rate of labor force participation in the
United States was roughly 59 percent. This rate
held fairly steady until the early 1960s, when it
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Labor Force Participation Rate
NOTE: Top panel: level (gray) and trend (blue) extracted with an LP96 filter. Bottom panel: cyclical component extracted with BP18,96
filters. The shaded areas denote National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions.
1 Unless otherwise noted, the source for data used in the figures is
the BLS.began to rise; during the first quarter of 2000,
the LFPR achieved its highest level—67.3 per-
cent of the working-age population. Over the
past few years, however, the LFPR fell from its
2000 level to 65.8 percent in January 2005. It
has since rebounded to 66.4 percent as recently
as December 2006.
Although the LFPR unquestionably trended
upward over the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the nature of its recent decline has sparked
some debate. Some economists argue that the
decrease reflects structural changes in the labor
market (i.e., a change in the trend of the LFPR),
whereas others view it primarily as a cyclical
deviation from the trend. Aaronson et al. (2006),
for example, use a cohort-based model to show
that the decline from 2000 until 2002 occurred
as a result of the weak labor market conditions
stemming from the 2001 recession. Although
the initial drop in the LFPR was due to cyclical
factors, their estimates indicate that the trend
LFPR began to decline in 2003. On the other hand,
Bradbury (2005) argues that the decline since
2001 is a reflection of slack in the economy and
is purely cyclical, although she does note that,
relative to previous economic recoveries, the
period following the 2001 recession was charac-
terized by unusually low participation rates among
teenagers and women.
To gauge the degree of labor market tightness,
it is important to determine how changes in the
trend and in the cyclical component contribute
to movements in the LFPR. If structural factors
cause most of the decline in participation, then
a low unemployment rate indicates a tight labor
market. On the other hand, if business cycle
movements cause most of the decline, a substan-
tial part of it should be reversed in a relatively
short period of time. People who temporarily
dropped out of the labor force will start looking
for jobs again and thus will be recorded as unem-
ployed. In the latter case, a low unemployment
rate overstates labor market tightness.
A cursory examination of Figure 1 suggests
that there may have been at least three different
regimes describing the LFPR over the past six
decades: zero growth before 1960, a constant
trend growth between 1960 and 2000, and a
declining trend subsequent to the turn of the cen-
tury. To estimate more formally how the trend in
the LFPR has evolved over time, we follow a stan-
dard technique in which we use a low-pass filter
to remove high-frequency fluctuations from the
raw data.2 In particular, we remove cycles with a
period less than 96 months. The resulting trend
is shown in the top panel of Figure 1. Consistent
with the business cycle tradition, we then identify
the business cycle component of the LFPR data
with cycles of periods between 1.5 and 8 years—
i.e., 18 and 96 months—which we extract by
applying a band-pass filter.3 The bottom panel of
Figure 1 shows the business cycle components
of the LFPR.4
Based on these calculations, we find that the
trend component peaked in October 1998 at 67.2
percent, declined afterward to a minimum of
66.1 percent in January 2005, and increased by
0.2 percentage points by the end of 2006.5 The
cyclical component of the LFPR increased slightly
after the 2001 recession, declined until August
2004, and recovered afterward.
To demonstrate some of the short-run cyclical
properties of the LFPR series, we compare the
business cycle component of the LFPR with those
of a common indicator of aggregate activity, indus-
trial production.6 The correlation between the
two and their relative standard deviations are
reported in Table 1. Based on the correlation, we
see that the LFPR is moderately procyclical (i.e.,
it rises during expansions and falls during con-
tractions). This finding is consistent with the idea
that during economic upturns, potential workers
are lured into the labor force because they per-
ceive their job prospects to be strong. During
recessions, on the other hand, workers not only
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2 For an overview of terminology, see the appendix.
3 See Baxter and King (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
4 To consider the decline in the LFPR from early 2000 to the end of
2005 and its slight recovery afterward as purely cyclical phe-
nomena, fluctuations with a period of up to 36 years would need
to be removed in the definition of the trend.
5 Clark and Nakata (2006) estimate the trend growth rate in the
LFPR to be 0.3 percent from 1957-81 and 0.2 percent from 1981-
2005. They attribute the decline in the trend to the deceleration
of women’s LFPR.
6 Industrial production data come from the Federal Reserve Board.lose jobs—thereby increasing unemployment—
but also exit the labor force altogether because the
number of employment opportunities becomes
relatively scarce.
These fluctuations in the LFPR, however, are
small compared with those in industrial produc-
tion. Indeed, we find that the LFPR is one-tenth
as volatile as industrial production at business
cycle frequencies. This property of the LFPR may
reflect a high degree of inflexibility in the average
individual’s labor force participation decision
over time. Because individuals need an income
to support their consumption, many decide to
work (or at least seek work) regardless of whether
the economy is expanding or contracting.
The vast majority of the movement of the
LFPR, however, is associated with its trend, not
its cyclical components. In the next sections, we
explore the long-run evolution of the LFPR by
looking at its disaggregate components—specifi-
cally, its gender, age, and racial components.
GENDER AND THE LFPR
A substantial portion of the rise in the aggre-
gate LFPR beginning in the 1960s can be attrib-
uted to the rise in the labor force participation
of women. In 1950, approximately one in three
women 16 years of age or older participated in
the labor force. Figure 2 illustrates the rise in
female labor force participation over the latter
half of the twentieth century: The LFPR for all
women is depicted by the solid blue line, while
the solid black and dotted lines show the LFPR
for married and single women, respectively.7 By
1999, the overall female LFPR rose to its peak of 60
percent. As Figure 2 shows, much of the increase
in women’s participation can be attributed to
married women, whose LFPR rose by more than
30 percentage points between 1955 and 2005. The
LFPR of single women has also increased over
the past several decades, but much more mod-
estly. Since 1999, the overall women’s LFPR has
remained fairly steady: between 59 and 60 percent.
Figure 3 highlights the differences in the LFPR
across genders. In particular, Figure 3 reveals a
persistent decline in men’s LFPR since 1950, the
same period over which women’s LFPR saw its
most significant increase. During that period,
the male LFPR fell by 13 percentage points to its
2006 rate of less than 75 percent.
The cycle decomposition of the LFPR by
gender bears some similarity to that of the aggre-
gate (Table 1); however, two important differences
emerge. First, men’s participation tends to be
somewhat more procyclical than women’s par-
ticipation. The correlation between industrial
production and men’s LFPR at business cycle
frequencies is 0.41, whereas the same correlation
for women’s LFPR is 0.28. This result may, in
part, reflect the added-worker effect, in which
women enter the labor force to compensate for a
spouse’s loss of a job. That is, as men become
unemployed during an economic downturn, some
women may choose to enter the labor force to off-
7 A fourth category, not shown in the figure, includes widowed,
divorced, and separated women. Their LFPR held fairly steady
around 40 percent between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s and
increased by less than 10 percentage points by the early 2000s.
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Table 1
Second Moments of the Business Cycle Components of LFPR, Total and by Gender
Total Men Women
Corr(x,ip) 0.35 0.41 0.28
(0.13, 0.53) (0.24, 0.56) (0.04, 0.46)
Std(x)/Std(ip) 0.09 0.07 0.19
(0.07, 0.11) (0.05, 0.08) (0.14, 0.24)
NOTE: ip denotes industrial production. Block-bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals are in parentheses.set the loss in household income. This phenom-
enon may temper the procyclicality of the female
participation rate somewhat. Second, the LFPR
for women is nearly three times more volatile than
the LFPR for men, which may reflect the idea
that society has viewed women as the primary
child-rearer and the secondary earner.8 Thus,
while these days more women may be working
at any given time, they may remain more likely
than men to move in and out of the labor force.
The dramatic increase in married women’s
labor force participation has been the subject of
many studies, too numerous to detail here. We
highlight only a few of the myriad possible expla-
nations. The improvement in labor-saving house-
hold technologies has simplified many daily tasks,
such as cooking and cleaning, thereby giving
women greater time to pursue work outside of
the home (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu,
2005). This hypothesis is supported by evidence
on the differences in married women’s labor force
participation decisions across cities. In a recent
study, Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007) find
that married women’s LFPR was substantially
lower in cities with more traffic congestion, prox-
ied by longer average commuting time. Control-
ling for other factors such as the woman’s age,
education, non-labor income, number of children
by age group, and MSA unemployment rate among
white men, a small increase in a city’s average
commuting time significantly reduced married
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8 Compared with the first part of the sample, the volatilities of the
business cycle components were 1.5 and 3 times smaller for men
and women, respectively, after 1984. Stock and Watson (2003)
demonstrate the decline in volatility of many macroeconomic
variables, but they do not consider the labor force. However, they
do show that the conditional variance for civilian employment


















LFPR by Marital Status (Women)
NOTE: The data used in this figure are unadjusted annual percentages. The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
SOURCE: 1955-75, U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003, www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-30.pdf; 1976-2005,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.women’s labor force participation.9 If cities with
greater congestion involve greater amounts of
time required to run errands (part of household
production), women might participate in the
labor force less in those cities.
Alternatively, medical advances, such as the
birth control pill, have allowed women to delay
marriage and pregnancy, thus providing more
opportunity to invest in a career early in life
(Goldin and Katz, 2002). Changes in societal atti-
tudes have also made it more acceptable for
married women and women with young children
(under the age of 6) to work (Aaronson et al.,
2006). Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) find
that men whose mothers worked when they were
young children seemingly had a preference for
wives who also worked. These social changes
have enabled more women to pursue careers in
professional fields such as business, law, and
medicine, which has in turn led to higher returns
to experience, both in absolute terms and relative
to those of men (Goldin, 2006).
Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) consider that
“learning” is the underlying force behind the
sharp rise in participation rates for married women
with young children. When deciding whether to
join the labor force, women try to understand
9 For women with children under the age of 5, the effects were
largest. In particular, an increase of one minute in the average MSA
commuting time led to a 0.53-percentage-point decrease in the
LFPR of women with a high school education. For women with a
college education, their LFPR decreased by 0.22 percentage points.
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Figure 3
LFPR by Gender
NOTE: Left column: levels (gray) and trends (blue) extracted with an LP96 filter. Right column: cyclical components extracted with BP18,96
filters. The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.how important stay-at-home child rearing is in
determining the future labor market outcomes of
their offspring; stated another way, they observe
the outcomes of children of working women to
assess the importance of nature versus nurture.
As more women join the labor force, learning
happens at a faster pace, which reinforces the
increase in participation and generates the S-
shaped participation rate observed in the data.
Fogli and Veldkamp’s model is consistent with
survey data that indicate an increasing positive
attitude toward mothers who participate in the
labor force. The model is also consistent with
the continuous increase in women’s wages over
the past two decades, despite a flattening par-
ticipation rate. In a related paper, Fogli, Marcassa,
and Veldkamp (2007) argue that the rise in
women’s LFPR over the second half of the previ-
ous century can be partly explained by a spatial
component. In other words, a county whose
neighbors have high female LFPRs is likely to
also have a high female LFPR. This is because,
over time, learning occurs and cultural effects—
including women’s increased participation in
the labor force—spread to nearby counties.
Figure 2 shows that the increase in women’s
LFPR began to slow in the 1990s. Blau and Kahn
(2007) argue that the responsiveness of women’s
labor supply to changes in their wages decreased
by about half between 1980 and 2000. Moreover,
changes in their husbands’ wages had less of an
impact on married women’s labor supply during
this period. One explanation that the authors
provide is that, as more women entered the labor
force, they became more attached to working and
thus less responsive to changes in wages. Also,
higher rates of labor force participation meant
that fewer women were on the margin, taking a
wait-and-see approach to entering the labor force.
The end result was slower growth of women’s
LFPR during the previous decade.10
As with the rise in women’s LFPR, many fac-
tors have likely caused the decline in men’s LFPR.
Hotchkiss (2005) cites several reasons that have
led to earlier retirement, such as the creation of
Social Security in 1935 and firms’ increased pro-
vision of private pensions following the Revenue
Act of 1942. She also notes that the expansion
of Social Security to include disability insurance
gave workers more incentive to leave the labor
force due to disability. Juhn (1992) argues that
the decline in real wages of less-skilled workers
between 1967 and 1987 caused most of the decline
in employment of prime-age men over the sam-
ple’s last 15 years. Similarly, Welch (1997) finds
that a shift in labor supply caused the LFPR of
prime-age men to decrease in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, but the decline in the subsequent
two decades was caused by a change in relative
wages (i.e., lower wages for less-educated com-
pared with college-educated men). One might
think that the rise in women’s participation rates
would be a contributing factor to the decline in
men’s participation rates; primarily, if a husband
has a working wife, he has less incentive to be in
the labor force. However, Juhn and Murphy (1997)
show that the evidence does not support this
claim. Despite an increase in employment among
wives of low-wage men between 1969 and 1989,
the change was much less than the increase in
employment among wives of middle- and high-
wage men.
AGE AND THE LFPR
One of the most important demographic
changes affecting the U.S. LFPR is the evolution
of the population’s age distribution. Most notice-
ably, the approximately 78 million individuals
belonging to the baby-boom generation—those
born between 1946 and 1964—have been reaching
the latter stages of their working lives. With such
a large fraction of the U.S. population growing
older, the recent decline in the overall LFPR is
understandable.
To get a sense of the influence the boomers
have exerted on the LFPR, consider first the
change in the median age of the U.S. labor force.
As the baby-boom cohort (representing roughly
one-third of the potential workforce) has grown
older, the median age of the U.S. labor force has
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10 Cohany and Sok (2007) discuss changes in the LFPR of married
women with children of various ages. They show that of all married
mothers, those with infants have experienced the largest decline
in their LFPR since the late 1990s.risen from less than 35 in 1980 to almost 41 in
2005. As demonstrated by Figure 4, which shows
how the median age of the labor force has changed
across decades going back to 1970 as well as pro-
jections through 2050, the aging of the labor force
is expected to continue at least until 2020.
The importance of the baby-boom generation
in explaining the recent trends in the LFPR can
be inferred from Figure 5, which highlights the
differences in labor force participation across age
groups. In 2000, the baby boomers were 36 to 54
years old, putting them in the prime-age working
group. Not surprisingly, this group had relatively
high participation rates that year: 91.6 percent of
men and 76.7 percent of women had or actively
sought employment (Toossi, 2005). However, after
2000, baby boomers began moving into age cate-
gories with typically lower LFPRs. In 2005, the
age group 55 to 59 was composed entirely of baby
boomers, and only 78 percent of these men and
66 percent of these women were in the labor force.
Aaronson et al. (2006) estimate that about 95
percent of the total decline in the LFPR between
1995 and 2005—which was 0.44 percentage
points—can be attributed to changing population
shares of the different age groups. The decline in
the population shares of those aged 25 to 34 and
35 to 44 caused the LFPR to decrease by 0.57 and
0.35 percentage points, respectively. The increase
in the share of those aged 45 to 54, which was
made up entirely of baby boomers, caused a rise in
the LFPR of 0.41 percentage points. The increase
in those aged 55 to 64 put downward pressure
on the LFPR, causing a 0.1 percent decline. As
baby boomers begin to approach retirement, how-
ever, further downward pressure will be exerted
on the overall rate of labor force participation.
According to Aaronson et al. (2006), the LFPR
will fall by 0.87 percentage points between 2005
and 2010 as a result of the population being more
heavily concentrated among older age groups.
They expect the increase in the shares aged 55 to
DiCecio, Engemann, Owyang, Wheeler
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Median Age of the Labor Force
NOTE: The 1970 and 1980 data were obtained from Toossi (2002), and the remaining data were obtained from Toossi (2006).64 and 65 and older to cause a total decline in
the LFPR of about half a percentage point.
There is, however, one especially interesting,
countervailing trend that has partially offset the
natural decrease in the LFPR among an aging
population. Within the past two decades, there
has been a steady rise in the participation rate
among individuals 55 years of age and older (see
Figure 5). Just among those aged 55 to 64, the
LFPR has increased by approximately 10 percent-
age points over the past two decades.
A number of reasons may help explain the
increase in participation rates among older
workers.11 First, the ability to draw full benefits
from Social Security depends on a person’s year
of birth; later generations must work longer to
receive full benefits. For example, full retirement
occurs at age 65 for individuals born in 1937 or
earlier, age 66 for those born between 1943 and
1954, and age 67 for individuals born in 1960 or
later. Furthermore, delaying retirement until age
70 allows workers to be eligible for even higher
benefits. These features of the Social Security
program should push back the age at which some
workers exit the labor force (Social Security
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11 Friedberg (2007) gives an overview of some possible explanations
for the recent increase in delayed retirement (e.g., changes in












































































































LFPR by Age Group
NOTE: Left column: levels (gray) and trends (blue) extracted with an LP96 filter. Middle column: cyclical components extracted with
BP18,96 filters. Right column: population shares. The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.Administration, 2006). Second, Social Security
benefits have grown at a substantially slower
pace since the mid-1980s. Data from the Social
Security Administration show that real average
monthly benefits rose by 88 percent between 1965
and 1985 but by only 23 percent over the follow-
ing 20 years. For 65 percent of the beneficiaries,
Social Security benefits represent over half of
their total income (Social Security Administration,
2006). Hence, this decreased growth in benefits
could force some retirees back into the labor force
to help finance their retirement years. Third,
Americans are now living longer than in previous
decades. For 65-year-old men, life expectancy has
risen by nearly four years since 1970; for women,
it has risen by three years. With greater numbers
of both productive years in which they can work
and “retirement” years that they must finance,
individuals may decide to work longer. Fourth,
older workers may choose to remain employed
longer to maintain health insurance coverage.
Recent surveys (Kaiser Family Foundation and
Health Research and Educational Trust, 2006;
Kaiser Family Foundation and Hewitt Associates,
2006) have suggested that the fraction of firms
offering their active workers the benefit of health
insurance after they retire decreased by one-half
between 1988 and 2005 (Burtless, 2006). Because
workers, in general, do not qualify for Medicare
until age 65, this development may also encour-
age workers to delay retirement.
Along with the baby-boom generations,
teenagers have also contributed to the recent
decline in labor force participation. Although
the teen LFPR has been trending downward
since the 1970s, it experienced a sharper-than-
usual decline beginning in 2000. Over half of the
decline in the overall LFPR since then can be
attributed to changes among those aged 16 to 19.
Between 2000 and 2003, their LFPR dropped by
7.5 percentage points—a much larger decline
than the 0.6-percentage-point drop in the overall
LFPR. Since that time, teen participation rates
have yet to recover, and they remain around 44
percent (Aaronson, Park, and Sullivan, 2006).
Once again, economists studying this down-
ward trend have identified a number of possible
explanations. Because teen workers have a weak
attachment to the labor market, they are particu-
larly sensitive to economic downturns. Conse-
quently, when the U.S. economy entered its most
recent recession, teen participation rates declined
significantly. However, Aaronson, Park, and
Sullivan (2006) argue that a weakened demand
for teen labor is unlikely to be the main source of
the recent downturn, especially because there was
no simultaneous increase in the rate at which
teenagers reported that they sought employment.
Instead, they argue that the failure of the teen
LFPR to rebound within the first five years after
recovery means that the decline is caused by
supply-side factors—namely, the decision to
acquire more education.
The fraction of 16- to 19-year-olds who are
currently enrolled in school has risen over the
past 20 years: from 61 percent in 1987 to 68 per-
cent in 1997, and further to 73 percent by 2005.
A large part of this rise can be linked to the
increase in the economic return to education,
especially a college degree, since the late 1970s.
There is also some evidence that the expansion
of educational opportunities, particularly in the
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Table 2
Second Moments of the Business Cycle Components of LFPR by Age Group
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Corr(x,ip) 0.55 0.30 0.18 0.10 0.03 –0.14 0.10
(0.42,0.66) (0.07,0.50) (–0.03,0.40) (–0.11,0.28) (–0.21,0.28) (–0.31,0.03) (–0.07,0.25)
Std(x)/Std(ip) 0.57 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.55
(0.48,0.69) (0.18,0.27) (0.08,0.12) (0.05,0.08) (0.07,0.10) (0.12,0.20) (0.43,0.71)
NOTE: ip denotes industrial production. Block-bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals are in parentheses.form of increased financial aid, has led to an
increase in college enrollment. A possible expla-
nation for the recent larger-than-normal decline
in the teen LFPR could stem from teenagers plac-
ing even higher value on education than in the
past (Aaronson, Park, and Sullivan, 2006).
In addition to its influence on the long-run
LFPR trends, the age distribution of the American
workforce can also influence the short-run fluc-
tuations exhibited by the aggregate participation
rate because there are substantial differences in
the cyclical properties of the LFPRs of various
age groups. In particular, the business cycle com-
ponents for persons older than 20 are moderately
procyclical/acyclical (Table 2), while teen partici-
pation is strongly procyclical. The volatilities
are low for those between 25 and 54 years of age,
but much higher for young and elderly workers.12
Thus, changes in the labor force’s age distribution
may lead to variations in how the LFPR responds
to business cycle conditions.
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE LFPR
A third demographic feature influencing the
evolution of the aggregate LFPR is the increase
in the racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. pop-
ulation over the past several decades. Whether
because of social, economic, or political factors,
participation rates appear to vary across racial
groups. Figure 6 plots the LFPRs for white, black,
and Hispanic men since the 1970s: Clearly,
Hispanic men tend to have higher participation
rates than either white men or black men. Over
the sample time frames, the average LFPR for
Hispanic men was 80.5 percent. White men and
black men averaged 76.8 percent and 70.1 percent,
respectively.13 Similarly, the average yearly
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12 The volatilities declined after 1984 by a factor of 1.6 to 1.8 for
ages 20 to 54 and by a factor of 1.3 for teenagers. For workers 55
and over, the volatilities increased slightly in the post-1984 period.
13 The sample spans from January 1972 to November 2006 for whites
and blacks and June 1976 to November 2006 for Hispanics.
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LFPR by Race/Ethnicity: Men
NOTE: The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.growth rate among Hispanic men was higher
than for the other two groups. The LFPR of white
men declined by 0.2 percent each year and that
of black men declined by 0.3 percent each year
on average, while the LFPR of Hispanic men had
zero growth on average. From the early 1970s to
2000, the Hispanic share of the total population
increased by more than 7 percentage points (to
11.3 percent); it is therefore not surprising that
the aggregate U.S. LFPR rose in the decades prior
to 2000.
Among women, however, these three groups
show the reverse ordering: Hispanics tend to
have the lowest participation rates while blacks
tend to have the highest. The average over the
entire sample of the LFPR for white, black, and
Hispanic women was 54.7 percent, 57.0 percent,
and 52.2 percent, respectively. The rise in the
fraction of Hispanic women in the population,
therefore, very likely had the opposite effect that
the rise in the fraction of Hispanic men had: It
decreased the average LFPR. Still, participation
rates among women of all racial groups showed
general increases between 1980 and 2000, and
these increases were similar across the three
groups (Fullerton and Toossi, 2001). Figure 7 plots
the evolution of women’s labor force participa-
tion broken down by race/ethnicity. In this case,
white women experienced the highest average
yearly growth in their LFPR. It increased by 0.9
percent each year on average, while Hispanic
women saw their LFPR increase by 0.8 percent
per year and black women saw theirs increase
the least, by 0.7 percent per year.
Once again, a number of explanations exist
for differences in rates of labor force participation
across races.14 One of the most likely causes for
the higher LFPR of Hispanic men is that they
tend to be younger than the general population
14 For a more complete overview of the black-white gaps in various
labor force statistics, see Bradbury (2000).
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LFPR by Race/Ethnicity: Women
NOTE: The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.and in age groups that have higher LFPRs. Several
studies cite the increased demand for skilled
labor beginning in the 1980s as a reason for some
men—especially less-skilled black men—to drop
out of the labor force. Chandra (2000) shows that
in 1940, employment rates for white and black
men were similar across education groups. How-
ever, in 1990 the less-educated black men were
much less likely to be employed than their white
counterparts. Similarly, Bound and Holzer (1993)
show that although industrial shifts from manufac-
turing to other sectors hurt wages for both white
and black men, black employment (especially
among less-educated young blacks) declined the
most during the 1970s, which also carried over
into the 1980s.
Although all women saw an increase in their
LFPR over this time period, black women saw a
much larger increase during the 1990s than the
other groups. Juhn and Potter (2006) argue that
black women were affected the most by changes
in welfare and tax policy during that time, which
led to a rise in the LFPR of single mothers.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
During the past half century, the U.S. LFPR
has seen dramatic changes, which have been
driven by the rise of women’s participation, an
aging of the baby-boom generation, and growing
ethnic diversity within the general population.
What does the future hold for U.S. labor force
participation? According to a report published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the overall LFPR
is projected to decrease slightly to 65.6 percent in
2014 (Toossi, 2005). Two main factors are expected
to continue to exert downward pressure on the
participation rate: the continued decline in the
teen LFPR—which is projected to decline from
43.9 percent in 2004 to 39.3 percent in 2014—
and the aging of the baby-boom generation. This
second factor, however, is likely to lower aggregate
participation rates for the next several decades.
As mentioned earlier, the baby boomers have
already begun entering into the 55-and-older age
category. In her BLS report, Toossi (2005) pro-
jected that the fraction of Americans in this age
group will rise from 28.4 percent of the adult
population today to 33.7 percent by 2014; the
Census Bureau projects this figure to be 39 per-
cent by 2030. In contrast, the fraction of the
population in the prime-age working group is
projected to fall from 55.3 percent today to 51.1
percent by 2014 and 47 percent by 2030.
As baby boomers enter successive age groups,
their LFPR should fall dramatically. For instance,
the 55 to 59 age group had an LFPR of 72 percent
in 2006, and the 60 to 64 age group had an LFPR
of approximately 53 percent. Among those 65
and older, the LFPR was just over 15 percent.
These numbers, coupled with the increasing
proportion of the U.S. population beyond their
prime working age over the coming years, suggest
that successive generations will be unable to com-
pensate for the baby boomers’ exit from the labor
force and U.S. labor supply will decline.
To be sure, participation rates for groups 55
and older are expected to increase, which will
partially offset the downward pull that older
groups have on the overall LFPR. In fact, there is
already some evidence of this following the 2001
recession, when this age group had larger-than-
normal increases in the LFPR (Bradbury, 2005).
In 2014, approximately 41 percent of the group
is expected to be in the labor force, up from 38
percent in 2006.
Still, most studies estimate that the rate of
labor force growth in the United States will
decrease over the next decade, if not longer (e.g.,
Aaronson et al., 2006). In the event of such a
drop-off, it may become increasingly difficult to
maintain growth in our standard of living because
there will be fewer workers generating goods,
services, and income for each resident in the
country. The principal challenge in the presence
of a declining LFPR, therefore, will be to find ways
to enhance the productivity of the individuals
that do choose to work. Investing in education,
physical capital accumulation, and research and
development may be three avenues to such an end.
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Trend and Business Cycle Components
Any time series can be decomposed into cyclical components of different frequencies. The fre-
quency of a cycle is inversely related to its period. The period of a cycle is simply the time between
subsequent peaks. We consider three components:
Trend component: The trend is obtained by removing fluctuations with periods higher than 8 years
(i.e., 96 months) with a low-pass filter.
Business cycle component15: We extract the business cycle component of a time series using a band-
pass filter, which removes the trend component (period higher than 8 years) and the high-frequency
component (period less than 1.5 years).
High-frequency component: This corresponds to fluctuations with periods less than 1.5 years.
Figure A1 illustrates this decomposition for industrial production. We use the business cycle
component of industrial production to determine the correlation of participation rates for various
demographic groups with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle (see Tables 1 and 2).
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15 We sometimes refer to the business cycle component as the cyclical component with a slight abuse of terminology.
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NOTE: Industrial production data are from the Federal Reserve Board. The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.